1 My Principle was differently motivated and put to uses different from Huemer's. In this paper I shall explore some of the differences.
I Comparison
To make an initial comparison: The Principle was put forward as an epistemic norm, and in particular as an ought rather than merely a permission. It seems fair to suppose that one who obeys an epistemic ought is to some degree justified in holding the resulting belief (by "accept" I meant merely, believe 2 ). Thus, if we convert the Principle into declarative mood, we may infer "If S believes at the outset a thing [= proposition] that seems (to S) to be true, S's belief is to some degree justified."
Three remaining differences between that formulation and PC deserve comment.
First, "at the outset. called "explained unexplainers": Some explananda that justify their explanantia are themselves justified by explaining more primitive data in their turn. But many of the explananda, such as spontaneous perceptual beliefs or memories, cannot be justified in that way, because they themselves do not explain anything else. So now an apparently vicious circle: An explanatory hypothesis is supposed to be justified by the data it explains, but it can be so justified only if the data propositions are themselves justified; and the data propositions are justified "by being explained" only if the explanatory hypotheses are themselves justified. Since an explanans presupposes an explanandum, how is the whole explanatory enterprise to get started in the first place? There must be data propositions of some sort that are independently justified before explanatory coherence can come into play. Hence my Principle of Credulity. As written, it applies only to such data propositions, so in that respect it is weaker than PC.
Second difference: Huemer adds the qualification "in the absence of defeaters."
I am not sure why he does, for it seems redundant. Possibly, where I am speaking of prima facie justification only, leaving it understood that prima facie justification can be defeated, Huemer means justification overall. 3 If that is right, the present difference between the formulations is insignificant. impossible. So I think we must grant that I am not strictly entitled to say that the belief would be justified. I must fall back to: "If S believes a proposition at least in part because it seems (to S) to be true, S has some degree of justification for doing so."
And that last formulation is not wildly different from PC. I seem to have turned into a phenomenal conservative. (And so, I believe that I have done so.) Nonetheless there are still differences in motivation and in uses, and in liability to objections.
III A different defense PC has been defended on each of several grounds: that, vs. the justification skeptic, it (obviously) does vindicate gabillions of our commonsense beliefs; that considered as policy it conduces to our pursuit of truth (Huemer (2001) ); that to deny it is self-defeating (Huemer (2001) , (2007) Mother Nature argument is not intended as a reply to any such; I had already given entirely independent replies to as many as I could fit in (1988, Ch. 7) . Nor, n.b., did I claim either that our explanatory virtues' adaptive utility justifies them in the epistemological sense or that they per se provide any guarantee of true beliefs as output. I take the canons of theory preference to be epistemologically basic and not susceptible of justification by being derived from or being tested against some more fundamental norm(s); as Bentham said, "That which is used to prove everything else cannot itself be proved." (Formal probability theory, in particular, is not a more fundamental norm. 7 ) At best, the canons are justified by reflective equilibrium, which is 8 itself an explanatory coherentist method. The point of the Mother Nature argument was, rather, to offer a convincing reason why it is good and desirable for us to be designed to use the methods we (ideally) do use rather than being designed in some other way. And that reason explains the important sense in which our use of those methods is not arbitrary and is not just a matter of "making our minds feel good" (Hacking (1982) ).
IV Conservatism
The most contentious of the usual canons of theory preference is that of conservatism. Above, I expressed it as the policy of choosing the hypothesis that best squares with what you already have reason to believe, but actually I myself defend an even bolder version: prefer the hypothesis that best squares with what you already do believe, reasonably or not. That is the really contentious version; critics who do not mind simplicity, testability, fruitfulness and the rest sometimes balk at conservatism in this bolder sense, because it sounds particularly dogmatic, bigoted, pigheaded. The Mother Nature argument for it would be that arbitrary and gratuitous changes of belief, like arbitrary and gratuitous changes of institutional policies, come only at a price; they draw on energy and resources. 10 ("Arbitrary" and "gratuitous" in the sense of gaining no offsetting advantage; see sec. VII below.) Also, the instability created by a habit of capricious belief change would be inefficient and confusing. -As before, these are not deeper justifications of the conservative policy; according to 9 me, there cannot be one. They only explain why it is a good thing that our brains are conservative.
Conservatism has a slightly startling consequence (1988, p. 162 Conservatism applies to beliefs and not directly to seemings, but I think a parallel argument supports the Principle of Credulity. Though the appearance-reality distinction is (of course) vitally important, separating appearance from a differing reality is costly, again drawing on energy and resources. As before, there is sometimes an advantage to be gained by questioning an appearance rather than just maintaining the corresponding belief, but when none is in prospect, to hold the appearance at arm's length just runs the battery down. And suppose we are not to take most seemings at face value. Though (according to me) we would still hold 10 many spontaneous beliefs that are not based on seemings, there would still be at least a slight fog of unresolved seemings that probably would slow down action.
And these points apply not only to explained unexplainers, but to all appearances or seemings. Thus they recommend, though does not demonstrate, PC.
V Internalism
Regarding the four other arguments for PC mentioned above: The first The Principle has little to do with the internalism/externalism debate. All it does is furnish the explanatory-coherence machine with initial data propositions. 12 For that matter, I have never been sure whether the explanatory virtues themselves are internal or external. 13 Can I tell from the inside which of two hypotheses is simpler, or which explains more, which is more testable and so forth? Sometimes I think I can, and it is possible I always can subconsciously. But I could not say with confidence.
I myself have no stake in the internalism/externalism debate. For the record, I incline toward the view of Kornblith (1983) and Battaly (2001) is not the phenomenology, and (b) to say that the conditional was necessary would be at best controversial in the first place.)
Also, I see no motivation for assimilating intuiting to perceiving, once a seeming has been clearly distinguished from a belief. BonJour is right to speak of "appearing,"
but the sort of appearing that constitutes an intuition is no more perceptual than cognitive. 17 Intuitions, then, are intellectual seemings-true. 18 And so both the Principle of Credulity and PC apply to them-fortunately for us philosophers.
In what remains of this paper I shall address one class of objections to PC.
VII The charge of liberalism
It has been objected to PC that PC is too liberal. The same objection has (understandably) been made to conservatism and to the Principle of Credulity. 19 Obviously, if anything that seems true is to be believed, and if any belief whatever is to 14 some degree justified by the mere holding of it, then many completely crazy and paradigmatically irrational beliefs will count as justified.
That sounds fatal, but it is not. I shall begin by clarifying my own (1985, 1988) position, and then turn to a few more specific versions of the complaint.
In my case, it comes down to the degree of justification. In my scheme, the justification furnished by the Principle of Credulity is minute, the faintest edge, infinitesimal if you like. (That is all it needed to be, to feed the explained unexplainers into the coherence apparatus, and to break ties.) And as before, the justification is only prima facie, outweighed by any defeater or explanatory advantage however small (1988, p. 175) . So although I do maintain that "anything that seems true is to be believed" and that "any belief whatever is to some degree justified by the mere holding of it," those ways of putting it are misleading. They make it sound as though the subject is epistemically fine and can go around freely acting on the beliefs in question without compunction. Of course the latter is not so. I should have emphasized the qualification, "at least to the minutest degree."
There is still a problem, originally put to me by Robert Vishny: Even if the force of conservatism is vanishingly small, why does it go nonexistent in the face of compensating explanatory advantages? What about a situation in which two hypotheses differed so slightly in their other explanatory virtues that conservatism managed to bring the lesser just precisely up to the level of the former in overall 15 goodness? In that case, we would have a tie, and no conservative canon left to break it.
That point requires a concession: We cannot regard conservatism as a firstorder rule on a par with simplicity, power, and the rest; it must be a metarule, to be invoked only after the first-order rules have been applied and weighed against each other. That is already signaled by the formulation (1988, p. 176) "Do not change your view for no reason," because that last qualification is recursive;
"reason" has to mean "advantage in terms of the other epistemic virtues." Thus, conservatism occupies a slightly specialized place in our cognitive design. I have never been entirely happy with that feature, but it would help explain why critics are more skeptical about conservativeness than about the other explanatory virtues.
I turn now to other charges of liberalism. I think they are bad arguments, and my replies to them will not depend on my particular view that the justification afforded by seemings is minute.
Matthias Steup (2004) But each of these ignores the merely prima facie nature of the justification (or in Huemer's (2007) terms, the absence of defeaters). In a world whose inhabitants have evidence of perceptual unreliability, that evidence defeats the conservative presumption.
The case of wishful thinking is slightly more complicated, depending on whether the subject is able to consider that the thinking may be wishful. Suppose (a) the subject does so consider and inclines to admit the fault. Then, obviously, the justification is defeated. If (b) the subject merely concedes that the thinking may be wishful the justification is at least partially defeated. If (c) the subject does not consider, despite having reason to (such as knowing s/he is prone to wishful thinking on the topic in question), In that case I think the justification is defeated. But if (d) the subject does not consider because s/he has no reason to, then it seems to me her/his belief is still to some degree justified, so long as there is no other defeater in the form of countervailing evidence or the like. To insist otherwise would be to beg the question against PC. prospector is justified to some degree; the learned one is better justified, certainly on grounds of reliability and probably on grounds of coherence. In the skilled coprospector's case, there will be other supporting beliefs about the appearance of the pebble, its disposition in the setting, the locale, the co-prospector's own track record, etc., all of which the wishful prospector lacks.
In Markie's second example (p. 357), I see a walnut tree in my yard, and the tree both seems to me to be a walnut and seems to me to have been planted on April 24, 1914. The first seeming is due to my ability to identify trees; the second is due to sheer cognitive malfunction. Markie goes on to insist that no appeal to a defeater will help, for his objection is that the belief about the date should not count as even defeasibly justified.
Here there is an even more obvious difference than in the gold nugget case between the two beliefs. But as then, that alone does not show that the belief about the date is not justified to some tiny degree. The point would have to be that the belief could not possibly be justified by the subject's perceptual experience. Which is indisputably true, but not pertinent: in this case, the phenomenal conservative would not cite perceptual experience as justifying, but rather the seeming itself.
Markie might still insist that in the absence of empirical evidence, the belief is not even prima facie justified. But that would just beg the question. 20 Another putative counterexample is put forward by Michael Bergmann (2011, pp.12-13) : It seems to Jack that he has a hard spherical object in his hand, because he has in fact grabbed a billiard ball and has the appropriate tactile 19 sensations; so he believes that he has a hard spherical object in his hand. It seems to Jill that she has a hard spherical object in her hand, and so she believes as well.
But Jill's seeming is based, not on any tactile sensations, but on a smell a s of a lilac bush (cognitive/brain malfunction again). Bergmann contends that Jill's belief is (entirely) unjustified, because "[h]er seeming about the hard spherical object is improperly caused."
So of course it is, and her belief is not nearly as well justified as is Jack's, who could cite the vivid feel of the actual ball in his hand. But it does not follow that
Jill's belief is not justified to any degree at all. The case is a little hard to imagineJill has no appropriate tactile sensations, but it seems to her that she has a hard spherical object in her hand? We would need to hear more (for example, is she aware that she has no such tactile sensations?), and perhaps depending on the details we would agree that her prima facie justification is defeated; but Bergmann has done nothing to show that she does not have even a smidgen of prima facie justification.
VIII Conclusion
Though the arguments for PC are not crushing, I stand by my own. I also find PC plausible in itself, though not everyone else will. Moreover I have rebutted the strongest direct objections to PC known to me. 21 
